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Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. by William Wallace

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most part didactic or hortatory. Seldom—if ever—are they the utterances of ecstatic joy; nowhere have we the notes of a triumphant and jubilant faith. Yet surely moral enthusiasm and human sympathy are but wind and rattle and the delusion of an empty dream if the universe be not for us. But if the universe be for us, what can be against us? Either the “Message of Man” is not worth the paper it is written upon, or it is a message from the very heart of reality, the assurance to us that what is is Love. May we not hope that this same “messenger,” with his fine skill and wide sympathy, will, in the future editions which his book so richly merits, give us some token of this joyous assurance.

M. S. GILLILAND.

LONDON.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. Translated, with five introductory essays, by William Wallace, M.A., LL.D., Fellow of Merton College and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894. Pp. cciv. + 197.

It may seem ungrateful to begin an account of what Professor Wallace has done by complaining that he has not done more, and yet we cannot help regretting that he did not add to the obligations which he was conferring on students of Hegel by translating the “Zusätze” included in the collected works, instead of confining himself to the original text. In many cases the reports of what Hegel said in lecture are considerably clearer than the paragraphs on which he was commenting, and the result of the omission is that the student of Hegel in English remains at a considerable disadvantage. The increase in the bulk of the translation might have been a distinct gain, if it had forced Professor Wallace's own work out of the subordinate position in which he has placed it. His commentary is a good deal more than an introduction to his translation, and to have had it in a separate volume would have been a convenience to many readers to whom the translation is unnecessary.

Of the five essays, which occupy rather more than half the entire volume, the first and most important is entitled, “On the Scope of a Philosophy of Mind.” The relation of Hegel's philosophy to ethics and to religion is treated with very great felicity of thought and expression. Not only is the subordination of subjective *Moralität* to objective *Sittlichkeit* brought out, but justice is done to

an even deeper characteristic of Hegel,—the subordination of all morality, even in the wider sense, to religion, as compared to which it is only an inferior and imperfect realization of Absolute Mind. Between Hegel and the philosophers who deify Duty there is a great gulf fixed; a fact which has perhaps not been sufficiently recognized in England. The emphasis with which he has asserted that morality is imperfect till it is embodied in social life has possibly made us forget the further doctrine, of which Professor Wallace reminds us, “that the social order, however omnipotent it may seem, is limited and finite, and that man has in him a kindred with the Eternal” (p. ccxxiii.).

The treatment of Hegel’s relation to revealed religion is also very interesting, and lays sufficient weight on the difference between his stand-point and that of orthodox Christianity,—a difference which is sometimes ignored by commentators in an excess of religiosity.

Religiosity, however, is a danger against which Professor Wallace is always on his guard. It is the fear of it which has led him to translate *Geist* by Mind, instead of by Spirit. It is no doubt true, as he remarks, that “to average English minds the word spiritual would carry us over the medium line into the proper land of religiosity” (p. l.). It might be added that spirit is rather apt to suggest either an independent reality above individuals as their creator or a mere substance out of which individuals are formed, rather than a unity which only exists in differentiation, and which is a unity only because it is differentiated. There is always a danger that Hegel will be misinterpreted in the direction of crude theism or of crude pantheism, and that individuals will be degraded into mere creatures, or mere modes of the Absolute, and this danger is certainly lessened if we take mind instead of spirit as the name of the ultimate reality.

This course, however, is not free from disadvantages. The word mind would cause many readers to lay too much stress on the individuality and multiplicity of finite persons, and to forget that Hegel only holds them to be real and individual in so far as they are held together by a unity compared to which an organism is a loose and superficial bond. And to say that all reality was mind might be misinterpreted as an identification of Hegel’s position with Berkeley’s,—a mistake which would be less likely if we spoke of spirit. And if spirit suggests a resemblance between Hegel’s philosophy and orthodox theology, which does not really

exist, it points out, far more clearly than the alternative rendering, that Hegel regarded his system as doing all, and more than all, that orthodox theology had aimed at.

Certainly it is now more often held that Hegel ignored experience than that he never went beyond it, and for this reason Professor Wallace's choice must be regarded as correct. But it must be taken rather as an emendation of Hegel's own exposition than as equivalent to it, for, whether rightly or wrongly, it is always the side of unity and universality on which any over-emphasis in the original falls.

The second, third, and fourth essays deal with various points in Hegel's psychology, especially in connection with ethics. Professor Wallace remarks on the strange unwillingness of "transcendent" ethics to acknowledge the full and complete connection between the world of ethics and the world of nature,—an unwillingness absolutely incompatible with Hegel, although occasionally found in connection with what has been called Neo-Hegelianism (p. cxix.). And he also reminds us that ethics, if taken as a science, will, as much as psychology or the physical sciences, construct an unconscious and uncritical metaphysics of its own, which will be as incomplete as the other two, and may be more practically dangerous (p. lxi.).

The fifth essay is largely occupied by an account of the "Criticism of the German Constitution" of 1802, and of the "System der Sittlichkeit" of the same date. The interest of the latter is considerable, as showing that, however marked Hegel's affection for the Greek view of the state is in his systematic works, it was much stronger in the earlier part of his life.

On the whole, the volume must be considered as a very important help to the study of Hegel. It is to be hoped Professor Wallace will not be weary in well-doing. Much of Hegel still remains inaccessible to the English reader, and no one is better fitted to act as an interpreter.

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THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. By William Mackintosh, M.A., D.D. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons, 1894.

Dr. Mackintosh essays to construct a "natural," as opposed to a "supernatural," history of Christian doctrine. His general